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Why are cohabitation and extra-marital births so few in Japan? 
 
 
1.  The second demographic transition in Japan 
After the end of the 1950s when Japan completed fertility transition from the 
traditional high fertility regime to the modern low fertility regime, she kept around the 
replacement level of fertility up to the middle of the 1970s.  But since then Japanese 
fertility sank below the replacement level and, by and large, continued to decline, 
reaching 1.34 in terms of the total fertility rate in 1999 (Figure 1).  Such fertility 
decline was caused mainly by the postponement of marriage and childbearing and 
partly by the decline in marital fertility (Atoh, 1992; NIPSSR 2000; Ogawa, 2000).    The 
proportion never married in the prime reproductive ages continued to rise since the 
middle of the 1970s up to now: Those proportions for women aged 25-29 and 30-34 
increased from 21 to 48 percent and from 8 to 20 percent respectively between 1975 and 
1995 according to the Population Census (Figure 1).  The mean age at first marriage 
for women continued to rise by 2.5 years from 24.2 to 26.7 years old between 1970 and 
1998 and, also, the mean age at the first childbirth rose by 2.2 years from 25.6 to 27.8 
years old during the same period according to the Vital Statistics (SID-MHW, 2000a). 
In addition, the crude divorce rate which had been very low level, around 0.7 per 
thousand population in the 1960s, began to rise since then and reached 1.94 per 
thousand population in 1998.  The life-time probability of divorce increased from 
around one out of eleven marriages to around one out of six marriages between 1965 
and 1990 (Takahashi, 1997).  Related to such increase in the divorce rate, the 
proportion of remarriage for women among the total annual number of marriage 
doubled from around 6 percent in the 1960s to 12 percent in 1998 (SID-MHW, 2000). 
All these demographic changes which occurred in Japan in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century were, more or less, common to those which occurred in the Western 
societies since the middle of the 1960s, so that such demographic changes in Japan may 
be called “the second demographic transition” (Van de Kaa, 1989).  But there is one 
conspicuous difference in their demographic situation between Japan and the Western 
countries, especially the Northern and Western European countries: It is very low 
prevalence of cohabitation and extra-marital births in Japan.  According to the 
Eleventh National Fertility Survey undertaken by NIPSSR in 1997, the proportions of 
never-married women aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 who were currently cohabiting with a 
non-married partner were only about 2.3, 1.0 and 1.5 percent respectively (NIPSSR, 
1999).  Also, according to the vital statistics, the proportion of extra-marital births   2
among the total annual number of live births has been only one percent-level, though it 
has been very moderately increasing (SID-MHW, 2000a).  In contrast with Japan, the 
proportion of extra-marital births has been rising tremendously among all the Western 
societies in these thirty years, though there is currently a large difference in this 
proportion among them: between about 39 to 62 percent for the Nordic countries and 
about 4 to 15 percent for the Southern European countries in 1999 (Council of Europe, 
2000).  It is clear that behind such remarkable increase in the extra-marital births 
there has been a corresponding increase in cohabiting couples (United Nations, 1991; 
UNECE, 1997ʙ2001). 
Then, the question is why cohabitation and extra-marital births are so few in 
Japan which has had similar trends with the Western societies with respect to other 
demographic characteristics.    This question deserves pursuing for the sake of shedding 
light on root-causes of very low fertility in Japan, because there is currently a strong 
positive cross-national correlation between the proportion of extra-marital births and 
the total fertility rate (Figure 2). 
 
2.  Why have cohabitation and extra-marital births increased so much in the Western 
societies? 
Up to the middle of the 1960s, cohabitation and having extra-marital births have 
not been popular even in the Western societies.  But they have continued to increase 
since then.  Then, why have cohabitation and extra-marital births increased so much 
in the Western societies since then?  There are at least there possible explanations for 
this question. 
The first one is a technological explanation (Van de Kaa, 1989; Preston, 1987).  
The oral contraceptive pill was developed and came to be prevalent in the middle of the 
1960s in the Western societies.  The pill is different from other contraceptive methods 
which had been popular in the Western societies before the introduction of the pill, such 
as withdrawal (coitus interuptus), douche, or female clinical methods like diaphragm, 
foam or tablet, in the point that it was a female-dominant, coitus-free, easy-to-use and 
very effective method. With this method more Western women came to control their 
pregnancies and births as they wish without depending upon their partner.  The 
availability of the pill is thought to have promoted “sex revolution”, that is, the rising of 
sex experiences among unmarried youth and cohabitation, because it led to the 
reduction of the fear of unwanted pregnancies among unmarried women.    The increase 
of extra-marital births seems to have occurred after the sufficient increase of 
cohabitation, or in other words, after cohabitation was accepted in a society as a way of   3
life for the youth. 
The second one is an explanation by women’s emancipation. More and more 
women have achieved longer and higher education, been engaged in gainful 
employment and continued to keep their job after marriage or childbearing in the 
Western societies since the 1960s.  Wage differentials by gender have shrunk, so that 
women have come to be economically more independent.  As women became socially 
and economically more equal to men, they desired to form an equal partnership with 
men.  Since the traditional marriage form was, more or less, characterized by the 
breadwinner-homemaker system (Davis, 1990), more emancipated women chose to form 
cohabiting couples, expecting a more equal partnership in it. 
The third one is an explanation by value change (Van de Kaa, 1989 and 1999; 
Lesthaeghe et al, 1988).  Among younger people conformism with religious teachings 
has been weakened, confidence in the existing religious organizations has been reduced 
and tolerance toward anti-social behavior has increased.    As younger people were more 
secularized, they came to cherish individual freedom of choice as opposed to existing 
institutional regulations.  They came to place the highest value on the desire for 
self-actualization.  Freed from the existing religion and morality, they began to 
determine their reproductive behavior as their individual rights for self-actualization.  
As a result, such reproductive behavior as extra-marital sex, cohabitation, extra-marital 
births, divorce and abortion which had been socially reproached before increased.  
While the age of the first demographic transition was that of “king-child”, the age of the 
second demographic transition became that of “king-pair”. 
 
3.  Why have cohabitation and extra-marital births not increased in Japan? 
Now, let us turn to the question of the low prevalence of cohabitation and 
extra-marital births in Japan. 
First, Japanese fertility transition in the 1950s was mainly brought about by the 
use of induced abortion which had been legalized by the Eugenics Protection Law in 
1948 (: This law was renamed and revised as the Mother’s Body Protection Law in 1999).   
Contraceptive behavior started to prevail among married couples in the 1950s, 
gradually replacing abortion as a chief method for fertility control in the 1950s and 60s, 
but the contraceptive prevalence rate among married women reached a plateau of 
relatively low levels (around 60 percent) in 1970s and remained there up to now (Figure 
3).  Among contraceptive methods the condom and the rhythm method had been the 
two most popular methods for a long time, followed by withdrawal, but with the gradual 
decline in the use of the rhythm method the condom became the single most important   4
method for the contemporary Japanese married couples (Table 1).  The use of 
female-dominant and effective methods, such as the pill, IUD and female sterilization, 
have been limited to the minority partly because of their legal ban or legal limitation for 
contraceptive use.  Generally speaking, Japanese married couples have been able to 
achieve their family size goal, about just more than two children on average, by the use 
of male-dominant contracaptive methods, complemented by the relying on legal induced 
abortion in case of contraceptive failures (Atoh, 1982). 
The oral high-dose pill was authorized in the 1960s for clinical purpose, but the 
oral low-dose contraceptive pill had long been banned and only in 1999 was authorized.   
Only a few percent of married couples had used the oral high-dose pill for contraceptive 
purpose before the legalization of the low-dose pill.  Even after the legalization of the 
low-dose pill, the use of the pill did not increase among married couples (PPRC, 2000) 
(Table 1).  It is difficult to guess real reasons why the low-dose contraceptive pill has 
not been legally authorized for a long time in Japan.  But the fact itself seems to have 
reflected, first, conservative attitude among medical people, who had the decisive power 
to authorize the pill in the administrization of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
toward reproductive freedom for women, especially unmarried women.  Second, 
feminism movement has been weak in this field, too, in Japan, compared with other 
developed countries.    This may be related to the fact that even highly educated women 
did not want to use available female-dominant contraceptive methods maybe due to 
their own conservatism or hesitancy to take an initiative in sex-related matters. 
Even without the high availability of the pill, “sex revolution” occurred in Japan, 
too. According to time-series surveys on sexual behavior among students at various 
levels, the proportion of those who had sexual intercourse has increased at each level of 
schools in the 1980s and 90s (Figure 4).  Among the unmarried people the main 
contraceptive methods are also overwhelmingly male-dominant ones such as the 
condom and withdrawal which have been popular among married couples (JASE, 2000; 
PPRC, 2000).  Partly because of this, the level of sexual activities among the single 
youth in Japan lagged far behind than in the Western societies: the proportion of 
women aged 20 having had sexual intercourse is at most 50 percent in Japan, while 80 
to 100 percent in many Northern and Western European countries (JASE, 2000; PPRC, 
2000; NIPSSR, 1999; United Nations, 1991 and 2000).    In accordance with the increase 
in sexual activities among the single, the number of pregnancies among single women 
aged high teens seems to have increased, judging from the fact of the increase in the 
rate of registered number of induced abortions for them from 3.1 to 9.1 per thousand 
population between 1975 and 1998 (SID-MHW, 2000b).  Also, the proportion of   5
“shotgun marriage”, that is, marriage with a pre-marital pregnancy, has increased 
probably in order to evade illegitimate births (Otani, 1993). 
Under the situation in which the prevalence of female-dominant, effective and 
easy-to-use contraceptive methods, such as the pill, is low, pre-marital sexes and 
cohabitation would have a high risk of unwanted pregnancies and births, which would 
be accompanied, in turn, by the interruption of educational and/or occupational career 
for women unwillingly.  Therefore, there is a possibility that a low prevalence of the 
low-dose pill affected by its long-term legal ban has been conducive to a low prevalence 
of cohabitation and extra-marital births in Japan. 
Secondly, it is true that Japanese women have been socially and economically 
emancipated.    More women have come to achieve higher education and the gender gap 
of educational attainment have shrunk in postwar years in Japan.  More than 90 
percent of female graduates of compulsory schools are enrolled in high schools since 
around the middle of the 1970s, and about 50 percent of those graduates advance to at 
least two-year colleges and just more than 25 percent of them advance to four-year 
universities (Figure 5).  There has been an increasing tendency for female students to 
choose departments of universities that are useful for occupational career and are 
competitive with male students, such as laws, economics, engineering, medicine and 
pharmacy rather than literature, arts and home economics (DSSP-MOE, 2000).   
Women’s labor force participation rates have increased since the middle of the 1970s at 
least up to the end of the bubble economy in the early 1990s (Figure 6).  Wage 
differentials by gender have shrunk dramatically up to now (MOL, 2000). 
Also, value systems on gender roles and families have changed gradually in this 
quarter of a century.    Survey data collected before the middle of the 1970s showed that 
almost 80 percent of respondents, male or female and old or young, agreed with such 
views as “Women would better marry”, “Men work outside, women keep home” and “It is 
not allowable to get divorced, even if you are not satisfied with your spouse”.  
According the subsequent surveys, those proportions continued to decline and reached 
40 to 60 percent-levels in the 1990s (Atoh, 1997) (Table 2).    Also in the same period, the 
proportion of those who supports the view that women should continue their job even 
after their childbearing have increased from only about 10 percent-level to about 30 
percent-level (Table 3). 
Thus, Japanese women have changed their attitude as well as their behavior 
regarding their social and familial roles, though these changes have been gradual.    But 
even highly-educated and/or professional unmarried women aged 20s and 30s have 
hardly dared to cohabit with their partner.  This may be partly due to their hesitancy   6
to take initiative in sex and contraception, as was mentioned before, but also due to 
their expectation of traditional gender role division even in cohabiting couples, similar 
to married couples.  According to a series of the National Time-Use Surveys, the 
average time spent by working married men for household chores, childcare and other 
family matters was only about ten minutes for weekdays and just less than one hour for 
Sundays in the 1990s (Table 4).  The proportion of men’s time spent for those family 
matters in Japan seems to be the lowest among developed countries (Figure 7).  The 
data from another survey showed that about two out of three unmarried women aged 18 
to 49 said that they hesitated to get married because they might have less freedom or 
they thought marriage and work and hobbies were not easily compalible (Atoh, 1998).  
Also, the same data showed that about three out four of the same women thought that 
once they get married they would have to mainly carry the responsibility of 
house-keeping and childcare (Atoh, 1998). 
Such reality that men’s share in household work and childcare is extremely 
limited in married lives and such women’s deep consciousness of the fixed gender-role 
division may have been condusive for deterring unmarried women to form even 
cohabiting couples. 
Thirdly, the data from a series of national surveys on views on religion and 
general morality for the general public showed that changes in general morality among 
the Japanese people have been very moderate in the four decades after the Second 
World War (IMS, 1994; Atoh, 1997).  Certainly, people’s religious sentiment has been 
gradually weakened in general and they have come to have greater interest in personal 
life rather than in social and national affairs.  For example, the data showed that the 
proportion of the respondents who replied “I venerate my ancestors” have gradually 
decreased from 77 percent in 1953 to 65 percent in 1993 (Figure 8).  Also, the data on 
“philosophy about personal life” showed that in 40 years from 1953 and 1993 the 
respondents in favor of “living a life fitting my taste rather than seeking desire for 
money and fame” increased by 20 percent and those who supported “living a 
take-it-easy life, spending each day nonchalantly” increased by 15 percent, while those 
who supported “living cleanly and righteously, forcing out all eveils in a society” and 
“living a diligent life to seek fame” and “devoting myself for the benefit of society instead 
of thinking solely about myself” decreased (Figure 9).  In this sense, secularism and 
individualism have progressed also in the postwar Japan, though very moderately. 
However, the change does not appear to be so large in Japan as in the Western 
societies where people place priority on the rights and freedom of individuals before 
anything else.  For instance, the data regarding a question comparing individual   7
happiness with the status of entire Japan showed that in 40 years between 1953 and 
1993 those who replied “It is only when Japan is improved that individuals become 
happy” decreased a little and those who replied “Japan becomes better only when 
individuals are happy” did not show any notable change (IMS, 1994).  Another survey 
data for the youth showed that the rates of replies to the question on alternative 
attitudes between “The most important thing is to satisfy my own life” and “Satisfying 
my own life is not sufficient, and I would like to do things useful to society” remained 
almost unchanged for 15 years between 1977 and 1992 (YS-PMO, 1994). 
Individuation seems to have not so much evolved as to break down traditional 
familism in Japan in which lineal parent-children relationships are regarded as more 
important than husband-wife (or man-woman) relationships probably, having its roots 
in the stem family system in the pre-modern Japan (Morioka, 1993).  Traditional 
familism seems to bind even the mind and behavior of young people in the 
contemporary  Japan.   
First, a series of surveys on reproductive behavior undertaken in 1980s and 90s 
revealed that almost 40 percent of unmarried women aged 20s and 30s had had no boy 
friends and almost 50 percent of unmarried men aged 20s and 30s had had no girl 
friends (NIPSSR, 1999).  According to another survey, about 70 percent of unmarried 
women having no boy friends said that they were not daring to look for their partners by 
any means (Atoh, 1998). 
Secondly, about 80 to 85 percent of unmarried working women aged 20 to 34 stay 
at their parent’s home (Atoh, 1998).  Among them about 60 percent said that they 
stayed there because it is economically difficult to live independently (Table 5).  But 
judging from the fact that about 40 percent of those aged 30s who could live their own 
life independently if they desired so pointed to such economic reason, it is difficult to 
regard them as a reserve group for becoming independent from their parents.  Among 
those who live away from their parents, only about the half said that they lived alone 
because they wanted to become economically and/or mentally self-reliant.  All these 
data suggest that the orientation of self-reliance or independence from parents’ 
influence is very weak among young women. 
If most of the young working women in the contemporary Japan is still bound by 
traditional familism, then it is very natural that they do not dare to live alone and 
eventually cohabit their partners. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
çççWe have discussed why cohabitation and extra-marital births had hardly   8
increased in Japan in the last quarter of the twentieth century, notwithstanding she 
had had such demographic changes similar to the Western countries as the rising 
proportion of the single people, the continuous postponement of marriage and 
childbearing, the increasing divorce rate and fertility decline far below replacement 
level. 
çççFirst, the low availability of female-dominant, effective and easy-to-use 
contraceptive methods, such as the oral pill, due to their legal limitation seems to have 
been partly responsible for this phenomenon in the sense that unmarried Japanese 
women would face the higher risk of unwanted pregnancies than those in the West if 
they cohabit.  But behind their legal limitation was there conservative attitude 
connected with traditional familism among medical people as well as among many 
women. 
Second, Japanese women have been emancipated socially and economically 
and their attitude toward gender roles in a family and in a society have changed 
gradually.  But these changes have not led to the increase of cohabiting couples.  This 
may be partly due to their conservative attitude toward sex and contraception but also 
partly due to their expectation of traditional gender role division even in cohabiting 
couples which is related to such reality as the very limited sharing of household chores 
and childcare by husbands in married couples. 
ççççThird, secularism and individualism have progressed very gradually in the 
postwar Japan, but individuation seems to have not so much evolved as to break down 
traditional familism in which lineal relationships are regarded as more important than 
husband-wife relationships, having its roots in the stem family system in the 
pre-modern Japan.  The fact that more than 80 percent of unmarried working women 
aged even early 30s cohabit with their parents seems to show that they feel more 
comfatable at their parents’ home and they have very weak motivation to leave it and 
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      Figure 1ɽTrends in the Total Fertility Rate and the Proportion of Women Never Married by age
  Source:  Ministry of Health and Welfare, Vital Statistics; Management and





























































































































































































































































































































ïĹĄ÷õúĀðFigure 8. Religious Mind and Veneration of Ancestors
Note   A. Rate of respondents who replied "Yes.  I believe in a religion" to  the question 
ɹɹɹɹ"Do you have faith or religious mind?"
ɹɹ   B. Rate of respondents who replied "I do" when asked
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1. "Want to become rich"
2. "Seek fame"
3. "Live to my taste"
4. "Live on nonchalantly"
6. "Serve for the benefit of society"
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